

# RC 422: Acceptance Testing and QA of Treatment Planning Systems

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London Regional Cancer Program



University of Western Ontario

Geoffrey S. Ibbott

MD Anderson Cancer Center

Radiological Physics Center

University of Texas



# Learning Objectives

1. To demonstrate the importance of the quality assurance (QA) of radiation treatment planning systems (RTPS) by reviewing significant treatment errors associated with their use.
2. To review the major functionality of a modern RTPS.
3. To highlight and summarize various reports that have made recommendations regarding acceptance, commissioning and QA of RTPSs with special emphasis on IEC-62083 and IAEA TRS-430.
4. To discuss accuracy requirements and criteria of acceptability of the modern RTPS.
5. To summarize acceptance testing procedures as proposed by the IAEA for a modern RTPS.
6. To provide an overview of commissioning a modern RTPS.
7. To provide an overview of the quality control associated with a modern RTPS.

# Disclosures


- J. Van Dyk
  - License agreement, Modus Medical Devices Inc
- G. Ibbott
  - Consultant, IsoRay Inc, Richland, WA
  - Spouse, Employee, Accuray Incorporated, Sunnyvale, CA

# Overview

- Scope of problem
- Complexity of modern RTPS
- Recent reports & recommendations
- Accuracy & criteria of acceptability
- IAEA proposal for acceptance testing
- IAEA report on commissioning
- Issues not addressed in current reports

# Introduction


- Technological revolution in radiation oncology
  - Enhanced use of imaging
  - Computer-controlled dose delivery
  - Tighter margins
  - Higher doses
  - Dynamic delivery
  - Smaller beams
- Central to this is the radiation treatment planning system (RTPS)






# Introduction

- Modern RTPS
  - Increased use of patient images
    - Possibly from various imaging modalities
  - Enhanced 3-D displays
  - More sophisticated dose calculation algorithms
  - More complex treatment plan evaluation tools
  - Generation of images used for treatment verification
  - Dynamic delivery
    - Wedges
    - IMRT



*IAEA TRS-430*

# Radiation Therapy Process




*Adapted from S Webb*

# QA in Radiation Therapy (RT)

- Two considerations in radiation therapy

Need for accuracy in  
RT process

Avoidance of  
treatment errors






# Need for Accuracy in Dose Calculations

- General accuracy desired in dose delivered to patient: **5%**

<i>Uncertainty Type</i>	<i>Uncertainty Range (%)</i>
<b>A</b> Absorbed dose to reference point in water phantom	2.5
<b>B</b> Determination of relative dose (Measurement away from reference point)	2.5
<b>C</b> Relative dose calculations	2.5
<b>D</b> Patient irradiation	2.5
<b>E Overall</b>	<b>5.0</b>

# ICRU Goal in Dose Calculation and Spatial Accuracy

- *ICRU 42, 1987 Recommends*
- Relative dose accuracy in uniform dose region: **2%**
- Spatial accuracy in high dose gradient: **2 mm**




# Avoidance of Treatment Errors

- Error
  - “The failure of planned action to be completed as intended (i.e., error of execution) or the use of a wrong plan to achieve an aim (i.e., error of planning).”

*Institute of Medicine. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, 2000.*

# Euphemisms for “Errors”

- Accidents
- Incidents
- Misadministrations
- Unusual occurrences
- Discrepancies
- Adverse events



# Medical Errors - General

- In United States...
- Annual errors
  - 44K-98K people die from medical errors
  - More than motor vehicle accidents, breast cancer or AIDS
  - Total annual cost \$37.6 to \$50 billion
- Most common types
  - Technical (44%)
  - Diagnosis (17%)
  - Failure to prevent injury (12%)
  - Use of drugs (10%)

**TO ERR IS HUMAN**  
**Building a Safer Health System**


# Medical Error Analysis

Recently, more public & acceptable practice


- Sample references - medicine in general
  - *Institute of Medicine. To Err is Human: Building a Safer Health System, 2000.*
  - *Sokol & Molzen. The Changing Standard of Care in Medicine, J Legal Med, 2002.*
  - *Baker et al. The Canadian Adverse Events Study: the incidence of adverse events among hospital patients in Canada. CMAJ 2004.*
- Sample references - RT
  - *Macklis et al. Error Rates in Clinical Radiotherapy. J Clin Oncol, 1998.*
  - *Cosset. ESTRO Breur Gold Medal Award Lecture 2001. Irradiation Accidents - Lessons for Oncology? Radioth Oncol, 2002*




# Avoidance of Errors in RT



IAEA 2000




ICRP 2000



IAEA 2001

# IAEA: Lessons Learned from Accidental...



- Describes 92 accidental exposures
  - 26 relate to radiation treatment planning
    - 16 external beam therapy
    - 10 brachytherapy

# IAEA: Categories of Errors

<i>Categories</i>	<i>Number of errors</i>
<i>Radiation measurement systems</i>	5
<i>External beam:</i>	
<i>Machine commissioning &amp; calibration</i>	15
<i>External beam therapy:</i>	
<i>Treatment planning, patient setup and treatment</i>	26
<i>Decommissioning of teletherapy equipment</i>	2
<i>Mechanical and electrical malfunctions</i>	4
<i>Brachytherapy:</i>	
<i>Low dose rate sources and applicators</i>	29
<i>Brachytherapy: High dose rate</i>	3
<i>Unsealed sources</i>	8
	<hr/> 92

# IAEA: Lessons... Examples

## *Description*

*Inconsistent/incorrect data set*  
*Insufficient understanding of algorithm*  
*Incorrect calculation of treatment times*  
*Incorrect distance correction*  
  
*Misunderstanding of complex treatment plan - verbal communication*  
*Incorrect positioning of beams on patient*  
*Wrong source strength*  
  
*Wrong isotope*  
*Error in removal time*

## *Comments*




Lack of proper commissioning/verification  
Lack of understanding on use of wedge factors  
Lack of independent check  
Lack of understanding/training  
Lack of independent check  
Lack clear documentation  
Ineffective communication  
Poor implementation of instructions  
  
Insufficient training/understanding  
No independent check  
No independent check  
No independent check



# Panama Incident

IAEA

- Error due to digitizer entry of shielding blocks
- Dose error up to ~2 times
- Affected 28 patients
  - 17 died, 13 rectal complications



# Factors Contributing to Errors

- Inadequate instructions in the RTPS manual
- Insufficient QA in treatment planning process
  - No manual checks
  - No written procedure of changes when entering the blocks
- Work organization
- Excessive workload
- Lack of coordination between members of radiation therapy team




# Errors Related to Modern Technology

- Sample errors
  - 2004-2005. Epinal, France. 23 patients overdosed by 7-34%. Error in interpretation of dynamic vs physical wedge
  - 2006. Glasgow, Scotland. Error associated with a change in process due to update of a record and verify system (Varis 7). ~60% overdose to brain. Patient died.
  - 2007. Detroit, MI. Gamma Knife
    - Reported 29 Oct 2007. Wrong side of brain treated – coordinates were reversed – related to how patient was scanned with MRI – feet first vs head first.
  - RPC IMRT phantom data
    - Later...

# Errors in RT: Contributing Factors

- Insufficient education
- Lack of procedures/protocols as part of comprehensive QA program
- Lack of supervision of compliance with QA program
- Lack of training for “unusual” situations
- Lack of a “safety culture”



# Complexity of Modern RTPS

- Many issues to address
  - Hardware
  - Software
    - Use of images, 3-D, IMRT, optimization, plan evaluation
  - Networking
    - Dosimetry devices
    - Imaging devices
    - Treatment machines
    - Oncology information system
    - Physicians'/physicists' offices/homes
- Some capabilities not easy to test

# Components of 3-D RTPS

## Hardware

- CPU
- High resolution graphics
- Mass storage (hard disc)
- Floppy disk/CD ROM
- Keyboard & mouse
- High resolution monitor
- Digitizer
- Laser/color printer
- Backup storage facility
- Network connections



# Components of 3-D RTPS

## Software

- Input routines
- Anatomy modeling
- Beam geometry (virtual simulation)
- Dose calculations
- Dose volume histograms/evaluation tools
- Digitally reconstructed radiographs
- Output [hardcopies, network, web connection (RTOG)]




*TPP Nucletron*

# Dose Calculation Algorithms


## A. Scatter Integration

### Superposition Principle


Beam  
Kernel




Slab  
Kernel



Pencil  
Kernel



Point  
Kernel








# Dose Calculation Algorithms

## B. Use of Anatomy Data

- Patient's Anatomy
  - As imaged by CT, MR, PET, etc
  - Geometry and density
    - As sensed by algorithm
  - Symmetry assumptions
- 1-D, 2-D, 2.5-D, or 3-D matrix



# Example Symmetry Assumptions



*From Nick Linton - Elekta*

# National/International Reports re RTPS

- Geoff Ibbott...

# National/International Reports re RTPS

- ICRU 42
  - *Use of Computers in External Beam Radiotherapy Procedures with High Energy Photons and Electrons*
  - 70 pages, 1987
- AAPM Report No. 55 (TG 23)
  - *Radiation Treatment Planning Dosimetry Verification*
  - 271 pages, 1995

# National/International Protocols

## American Association of Physicists in Medicine Radiation Therapy Committee Task Group 53: Quality assurance for clinical radiotherapy treatment planning

Benedick Fraass<sup>a)</sup>

*University of Michigan Medical Center, Ann Arbor, Michigan*

Karen Doppke

*Massachusetts General Hospital, Boston, Massachusetts*

Margie Hunt

*Fox Chase Cancer Center, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania  
and Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, New York, New York*

Gerald Kutcher

*Memorial Sloan Kettering Cancer Center, New York, New York*

George Starkschall

*M. D. Anderson Cancer Center, Houston, Texas*

Robin Stern

*University of California, Davis Medical Center, Sacramento, California*

Jake Van Dyk

*London Regional Cancer Center, London, Ontario, Canada*

*Med Phys 25:1773-829, 1998*



# 100 YEARS OF THE IEC

[ABOUT THE IEC](#)[IEC IN ACTION](#)[CONFORMITY ASSESSMENT](#)[STANDARDS DEVELOPMENT](#)[FOR MEMBERS AND EXPERTS](#)[WEB STORE SEARCH](#)[Version française](#)

## WHAT'S RELATED

- 🔒 **Special IEC community rate for *The Economist***
- ▶ IEC technical committee creation: the first half-century
- ▶ Development and growth of IEC technical committees: 1950 to 2006
- ▶ 1906 Preliminary Meeting Report
- ▶ IEC History: 1906-1956
- ▶ IEC Bulletin - 75th anniversary edition
- ▶ IEC SI Zone
- ▶ 1901-2001, Celebrating the Centenary of SI - Giovanni Giorgi's Contribution and the Role of IEC

1906-2006

## The electric century






In the beginning...

[Techline](#)[IEC Centenary Challenge](#)[Events](#)[Presidents](#)[General secretaries](#)[Cool stuff](#)

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# The International Electrotechnical Commission

-  68 member nations (including associate members)
-  Produces standards addressing the design of electrotechnical equipment.
-  Safety and performance standards apply to manufacturer's design and construction
-  Compliance tests can be *type tests*, or *site tests*
-  Site tests sometimes incorporated into acceptance testing procedures



# Adoption of IEC Standards

## In US:

- IEC standards (or sections) incorporated into ANSI standards, FDA regulations, NEMA guidelines, etc.
- IEC standards can be used as written; FDA requires vendor to report compliance

# Publications from WG-1

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## •Equipment for Radiation Therapy

- Linear Accelerators
- Cobalt Units (including Gammaknife)
- Orthovoltage Treatment Units
- Simulators
- Brachytherapy Remote Afterloaders
- Treatment Planning Systems
- Record & Verify Systems



# National/International Protocols

- For manufacturers

NORME  
INTERNATIONALE  
INTERNATIONAL  
STANDARD

CEI  
IEC  
62083

Première édition  
First edition  
2000-11

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Appareils électromédicaux –  
Règles particulières de sécurité  
pour les systèmes de planification  
de traitement en radiothérapie

Medical electrical equipment –  
Requirements for the safety of  
radiotherapy treatment planning systems

*International Electrotechnical  
Commission (IEC), 2000*

# IEC 62083 - Safe Operation of Treatment Planning Systems

- Format of displays, units, date & time
- Data limits, transfer
- Saving and archiving data
- Equipment and source model
- Patient model
- Treatment planning
- Dose calculation
- Treatment plan report

# National/International Protocols

- ESTRO 2004

## QUALITY ASSURANCE OF TREATMENT PLANNING SYSTEMS PRACTICAL EXAMPLES FOR NON-IMRT PHOTON BEAMS

Ben Mijnheer  
Agnieszka Olszewska  
Claudio Fiorino  
Guenther Hartmann  
Tommy Knöös  
Jean-Claude Rosenwald  
Hans Welleweerd

2004 – First edition  
ISBN 90-804532-7  
© 2004 by ESTRO

Available from ESTRO website:  
<http://www.estroweb.org/estro/index.cfm>

# National/International Protocols

- Netherlands Commission on Radiation Dosimetry 2006

## Quality assurance of 3-D treatment planning systems for external photon and electron beams

Practical guidelines for initial verification and periodic quality control of radiation therapy treatment planning systems

**NEDERLANDSE COMMISSIE VOOR STRALINGSDOSIMETRIE**

Report 15 of the Netherlands Commission on Radiation Dosimetry



Netherlands Commission on Radiation Dosimetry  
Subcommittee Treatment Planning Systems  
January 2006



# National/International Protocols



2004

- IAEA TRS-430, 2004

Figure 2




Figure 3



Available in pdf format from:

[http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TRS430\\_web.pdf](http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/TRS430_web.pdf)

# New Protocol



- IAEA-TECDOC-1540
  - April 2007
- Contributors:
  - Geoffrey Ibbott
  - Rainer Schmidt
  - Jake Van Dyk
- Scientific Secretary:
  - Stanislav Vatnitsky

# Upcoming Protocol

- IAEA Protocol for Commissioning of Radiation Treatment Planning Systems
  - Specific guidelines for IAEA supported systems


IAEA-TECDOC-xxxx

## **Commissioning of Radiotherapy Treatment Planning Systems: Testing for Typical External Beam Treatment Techniques**

*Report of the Co-ordinated Research Project (CRP) on  
development of procedures for Quality Assurance of dosimetry  
calculations in radiotherapy*


INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY IAEA  
2007

- Regular member
- Affiliated member
- Provisional member




# IAEA TRS 430 Contents

1. Introduction
2. Clinical treatment planning process
3. Description of radiation treatment planning systems
4. Algorithms used in radiation treatment planning
5. Quality assessment
6. Quality assurance management
7. Purchase process
8. Acceptance testing
9. Commissioning
10. Periodic quality assurance
11. Patient-specific quality assurance
12. Summary



# Quality Assessment Accuracy Requirements



AAPM TG53



# Sample Criteria of Acceptability

IAEA TRS 430

Situation	Absolute Dose (%)*	Central Ray (%)	Inner Beam (%)	Penumbra (mm)	Outer Beam (%)	Build-up Region (%)
<b>A. Homogeneous Phantoms</b>						
Square fields	0.5	1	1.5	2	2	20
Rectangular fields	0.5	1.5	2	2	2	20
Asymmetric fields	1	2	3	2	3	20
Blocked fields	1	2	3	2	5	50
MLC-shaped fields	1	2	3	3	5	20
Wedged fields	2	2	5	3	5	50
External surface variations	0.5	1	3	2	5	20
SSD variations	1	1	1.5	2	2	40
<b>B. Inhomogeneous Phantoms**</b>						
Slab inhomogeneities	3	3	5	5	5	-
3-D inhomogeneities	5	5	7	7	7	-

\* Absolute dose values at the normalization point are relative to a standard beam calibration point.

\*\* Excluding regions of electronic disequilibrium.



# Accuracy Requirements for IMRT

- Palta, J. 2003 AAPM Summer School Proceedings


Proposed Values of the Confidence Limits and Action levels for IMRT Planning

Region	Confidence Limit* (P=0.05)	Action Level
$\delta_1$ (high dose, small dose gradient)	$\pm 3\%$	$\pm 5\%$
$\delta_2$ (high dose, large dose gradient)	10% or 2 mm DTA <sup>⊕</sup>	15% or 3 mm DTA <sup>⊕</sup>
$\delta_3$ (low dose, small dose gradient)	4%	7%
$\delta_{90-50\%}$ (dose fall off)	2 mm DTA	3 mm DTA

\* Mean deviation used in the calculation of confidence limit is  $\delta_i = 100\% \times (D_{\text{calc}} - D_{\text{meas.}} / D_{\text{prescribed}})$


⊕ DTA = Distance to agreement

# Accuracy Requirements for IMRT





# Accuracy Requirements for Brachytherapy

- AAPM recommends  $\pm 2\%$  calculation accuracy, and grid spacing 1mm x 1mm x 1mm (TG-43 update 2004)
- RPC requires agreement with benchmark plans within 5%, and 5% or 0.5 mm for single source calculations



# IAEA TRS 430 Dose Calculations & Acceptance Testing

- Jake Van Dyk...



# IAEA TRS-430 Dose Calculation Algorithms

- Questions users should ask

TABLE 11. EXTERNAL BEAM DOSE CALCULATION ALGORITHM: DOSE IN WATER-LIKE MEDIUM WITHOUT A BEAM MODIFIER

	Question
General principle of relative dose calculation	<p>From interpolation in tables?</p> <p>From analytical functions?</p> <p>By addition of primary and scatter components?</p> <p>By superposition of pencil beam kernels?</p> <p>By superposition of point dose kernels?</p> <p>By Monte Carlo calculation?</p> <p>From a combination of the above possibilities?</p>
If an integration (or superposition or convolution) algorithm takes place	<p>What are the shape and dimensions of the volume elements?</p> <p>What are the limits of the integration volume?</p> <p>Is it applied differently for each of the dose components (i.e. primary, scatter, etc.)?</p> <p>Is there any correction for spectral modifications with depth?</p>
Influence of flattening filter	<p>Is there a correction for intensity and quality variation across the beam (horns)?</p> <p>Is there a correction for scatter radiation from the head and flattening filter (extrafocal)?</p>
Influence of main collimator (photons) and/or applicator (electrons)	<p>What is the model used to describe the profile in the penumbra region?</p> <p>How is it adjusted to match the actual measurements?</p> <p>Is there a difference between the <math>x</math> and <math>y</math> collimator pairs?</p>
Dose in the buildup region	<p>Is there any specific model to describe the dose in the buildup region?</p> <p>Is it sensitive to patient surface obliquity? How?</p> <p>Is it sensitive to beam modifiers, including block trays? How?</p>





# Acceptance Testing

- What happens in reality!
  - Catalogue delivered components
    - Hardware
    - Software
  - Test components for functionality
  - Sign acceptance document

That is how acceptance should not be done!



Customer Summation

Customer Summation and Release				
Site Name:	London Regional			
Address:	790 Commissioners Road E			
Address:	Radiation Oncology			
City / State:	London , ON N6A 4L6			
Sales Order Number:	02334R			
Customer Site Code:	N/A			
Site Installer(s):	Lee Huey			
<b>Pinnacle Software Options Installed</b>				
	Yes	No	N/A	
Stereo	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Dicom
Electron	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Dicom Print
Photon	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Film Scanner
Brachy	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	IMRT
Brachy43	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	OpenRTP
Dynamic Wedge	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	PhysReview
Dicom RT	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Picker Proprietary
				Remote Pinnacle
				GE DAT Tape
				P3MD
				No. of P3MD PC's
				n/a
System(s) setup and configured per the PROS Installation Procedure				
	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Yes
Standard hardware and hardware options installed and tested	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	No
Standard software and software options installed, licensed, and tested	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	N/A
Customer orientation performed, including power cycle	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
Customer shown where all documentation was stored	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
All image import / export devices operational	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	
<b>Exceptions:</b>				
<b>Back Order(s)</b>			<b>Root Cause</b>	
1) 5200-4067			1) On Backorder will be installed upon arrival	
<b>Open Issue(s)</b>			<b>Root Cause</b>	
New Installation: System must be commissioned before clinical use! <input type="checkbox"/>				
Upgrade Installation: Commissioned data must be verified before clinical use! <input type="checkbox"/>				
Customer Signature:		Date:	10/16/04	
Installer Signature:		Date:	10/16/04	

CS-18-02 Rev D Page 1 of 1



# How Should Acceptance Be Done?

- IAEA Protocol
  - Developed 14-18 March 2005 – Published April 2007
    - Consultants
      - *Geoff Ibbott, RPC/MD Anderson CC, Texas, USA*
      - *Rainer Schmidt, Hanover, Germany*
      - *Jake Van Dyk, London, Ontario, Canada*
      - *Stan Vatnitsky, Scientific Secretary, IAEA*
- Reference material
  - IEC 62083
  - IAEA TRS-430
  - Standard radiation data set

**NORME  
INTERNATIONALE**

**INTERNATIONAL  
STANDARD**

**CEI  
IEC**

**62083**

Première édition  
First edition  
2000-11

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**Appareils électromédicaux –  
Règles particulières de sécurité  
pour les systèmes de planification  
de traitement en radiothérapie**

**Medical electrical equipment –  
Requirements for the safety of  
radiotherapy treatment planning systems**

# From IEC 62083 (2000)

- *“... This standard defines requirements to be complied with by MANUFACTURERS in the design and construction of an RTPS in order to provide protection against the occurrence of such HAZARDS.”*

***This has not been demonstrated for the past ~7 years!!***

# Tests Defined by IEC

- **Type test:** *“For a particular design of device or equipment, a test by the manufacturer to establish compliance with specified criteria.”*
- **Site test:** *“After installation, test of an individual device or equipment to establish compliance with specified criteria.” “Note: The recommended replacement is ACCEPTANCE TEST.”*
- **Site test = Acceptance test**

# Testing Process Recommended by IAEA

- Manufacture to perform series of type tests
- Type test results should be documented and made available to user
- Site (acceptance) tests should be a subset of type tests performed at the time of TPS installation
  - Results compared to results of type tests

# Examples of Type Tests in IEC 62083

Clause	Requirement	Compliance?	
		Yes	No
<b>7</b>	<b>General requirements for operational safety</b>		
7.1	Distances and linear dimensions		
7.2	RADIATION quantities		
7.3	Date and time format		
7.4	Protection against unauthorized use		
7.5	Data limits		
7.6	Protection against unauthorized modification		
7.7	Correctness of data transfer		
7.8	Coordinate systems and scales		
7.9	Saving and archiving data		

Next slide



# Type Test Example

- **7.1 Distances and linear dimensions**
- Distance measurements and linear dimensions shall be indicated in centimetres or in millimetres but not both.
- All values of linear measurements requested, DISPLAYED, or printed shall include their units.
- *Compliance is checked by inspection of the DISPLAY and output information.*

# Equipment and Dosimetric Modelling

Clause	Requirement	Compliance?	
		Yes	No
<b>8</b>	<b>RADIOTHERAPY TREATMENT EQUIPMENT and BRACHYTHERAPY SOURCE MODELLING</b>		
8.1	General		
8.2	Dosimetric information		
8.3	EQUIPMENT MODEL, BRACHYTHERAPY SOURCE MODEL acceptance		
8.4	EQUIPMENT MODEL, BRACHYTHERAPY SOURCE MODEL deletion		

# Anatomy Modelling

Clause	Requirement	Compliance?	
		Yes	No
<b>9</b>	<b>ANATOMY MODELLING</b>		
9.1	Data acquisition		
9.2	Coordinate systems and scales		
9.3	Contouring of regions of interest		
9.4	PATIENT ANATOMY MODEL acceptance		
9.5	PATIENT ANATOMY MODEL deletion		

# Absorbed Dose Distribution Calculation

Clause	Requirement	Compliance?	
11	<b>ABSORBED DOSE distribution calculation</b>	<b>Yes</b>	<b>No</b>
11.1	<b>Algorithms used</b>		
11.2	<b>Accuracy of algorithms</b>		

- **AAPM Report 55, TG23, 1995**

- MILLER D.W., BLOCH P.H., CUNNINGHAM J.R. *Radiation treatment planning dosimetry verification*. AAPM Report Number 55, American Institute of Physics, New York (1995).

- **Netherlands Commission on Radiation Dosimetry**

BRUINVIS, I.A.D. *et al. Quality Assurance of 3-D Treatment Planning Systems for External Photon and Electron Beams*. 2006.

VENSELAAR J., WELLEWEERD H. Application of a test package in an intercomparison of the photon dose calculation performance of treatment planning systems used in a clinical setting, *Radiother.Oncol*, 60, (2001) 203-213.

# Type Tests

- Elekta
  - 6, 10, 18 MV
    - Venselaar & Welleweerd
  - Co-60
    - AKH, Vienna

*Venselaar & Welleweerd  
Radioth Oncol 60: 203-213,  
2001.*

Table 1


Correspondence of the NCS test set and the AAPM task group 23 test set<sup>a</sup>

NCS	Short description of the test (dimensions in cm)	AAPM TG 23
1a	Square field, 5 × 5	1
1b	Square field, 10 × 10	1
1c	Square field, 25 × 25	1
2a	Rectangular field, 5 × 25	2
2b	Rectangular field, 25 × 5	2
3	Square field, 10 × 10, SSD = 85	3
4	Square field, 9 × 9, wedge	4
5	Square field, 16 × 16, central block	5
6	Square field, 10 × 10, off-axis	6
7	Square field, 16 × 16, blocked to L-shaped field (irregular)	7
8a	Square field, 6 × 6, lung inhomogeneity	8
8b	Square field, 16 × 16, lung inhomogeneity	8
8c	Square field, 16 × 16, bone inhomogeneity	8
9	Square field, 10 × 10, oblique incidence	9
10a	Square field, 10 × 10, half phantom ('missing tissue')	–
10b	Square field, 20 × 20, half phantom ('missing tissue')	–
11	Asymmetrical field, 15 × 15; geometric radiation field centre at: 7.5,0; 0,7.5; 7.5,7.5	–
12	Asymmetrically wedged field, 15 × 15; geometric radiation field centre at: ±7.5,0; 0,7.5; ±7.5,7.5	–

<sup>a</sup> Tests 10–12 were not included in the original set.

# Sample Type Test


- AAPM Report 55
- Therac 20 (18MV)
- SSD test case
- SSD=85 cm  
SAD=100 cm
- Field size 10x10
- Central Axis  
Comparison
- Measured vs Pencil  
beam
- +/- 2%






# Sample Type Test

- AAPM Report 55
- Therac 20 (18MV)
- SSD test case
- SSD=85 cm  
SAD=100 cm
- Field size 10x10
- Profile Comparison
- Depth 3 cm
- Measured vs Pencil beam
- +/- 4 mm.
- +/- 2%




# Sample Type Test : Test 4

- **AAPM Report 55**
- Therac 20 (18MV)
- Wedge test case
- SSD=SAD=100cm
- Field size 9x9
- 45° wedge
- Profile Comparison
- Depth 3 cm
- Measured vs Pencil beam
- +/- 4 mm.
- +/- 2%




# Sample Type Test : Test 5

- **AAPM Report 55**
- Therac 20 (18MV)
- Central axis block test case
- SSD=SAD=100cm
- Field size 16x16
- 1x4x7 cm (w,l,t) block at the block tray
- Profile comparison
- 3cm depth
- Measured vs Pencil beam
- +/- 4 mm
- +/- 2%




# Sample Type Test : Test 7

- **AAPM Report 55**
- Therac 20 (18MV)
- Irregular field test case
- SSD=SAD=100cm
- Field size 16x16
- 12x12 (w,l) block at the block tray
- Depth dose Comparison -6 cm from the central axis
- Measured vs Pencil beam
- +/- 2%




# Sample Type Test : Test 4

- **AAPM Report 55**
- Therac 20 (18MV)
- Irregular field test case
- SSD=SAD=100cm
- Field size 16x16
- 12x12 (w,l) block at the block tray
- Profile Comparison
- 3 cm depth
- Measured vs Pencil beam
- +/- 4 mm
- +/- 2%



# Sample Type Test : Test 8b

- AAPM Report 55
- Therac 20 (18MV)
- **Lung** Inhomogeneity test
- SSD=SAD=100cm
- Field size 16x16
- 6x12cm (w,l) lung cylinder at 8 cm deep, 0.29g/cc
- Profile Comparison
- Depth 12 cm
- Measured vs Pencil beam with EQTAR
- +/- 4mm
- +/- 2%





# Summary: Testing Process Recommended by IAEA

- **Manufacturer** to perform series of “**type tests**”
- Type test results should be documented and made available to user
- “**Site (acceptance) tests**” should be a subset of type tests performed at the time of RTPS installation
  - Results compared to results of type tests
- ***Software upgrades***
- Type tests to be repeated and document by vendor
- Some site tests to be repeated by user
  - Depends on nature of upgrade

# Acceptance Sign Off: Based on IAEA Acceptance Protocol

This is to certify that version \_\_\_\_\_ of the RTPS software  
Software version  
produced by \_\_\_\_\_  
Name of manufacturer  
is compliant with the standards described in Section 5 of this IAEA protocol.  
Company representative \_\_\_\_\_  
Name Signature Date City

The type tests described above were explained to my satisfaction:


User/purchaser representative \_\_\_\_\_  
Name Signature Date City

# Commissioning

- Prepare system for clinical use
  - Provides experience/training for users
  - Enter appropriate measured data
    - %DD, TAR, TPR, beam profiles, wedge profiles, attenuation data, output factors, etc
  - Perform series of commissioning tests
  - Tests algorithms
    - Provides capabilities & limitations
  - Assess results to see if they comply with *specifications*
  - Provides documentation of system performance
  - Results of commissioning tests used later for QC tests

# Commissioning


- IAEA TRS-430 provides sample tests
  - System set-up/machine configuration
  - Patient anatomical representation
  - External beam commissioning
  - Brachytherapy commissioning
  - Plan evaluation tools
  - Plan output and data transfer
  - Overall clinical tests



# Phantoms Assessed by IAEA



**Gammex RMI**



**Euromechanics  
Medical GmbH**



**Standard Imaging Inc.**



**CIRS Inc.**



**Modus Medical Devices Inc.**

# Other Phantoms

- 3-D & IMRT QA



*Med-Tec*




# MLC Phantom

AAPM TG 66, 2003



*Modus Medical  
Devices Inc*

# MLC Phantom




Acrylic  
Air

- Varian 52, 80 and 120 Leaf MLCs
- Elekta
- Radionics micro-MLC

- Siemens
- Varian 120 Leaf
- Brainlab micro-MLC

# Multi-Observer Test

Does leaf end align with phantom geometry (air/acrylic interface)?



- Errors  $\geq 2$  mm, identified 100% of the time
- 1 mm errors identified 80% of the time


# RPC Phantoms

- Geoff Ibbott...

# RPC Phantoms



**Pelvis (4)**




**Thorax (9)**



**H&N IMRT (25)**



**SRS Head (4)**



**Liver (2)**



# IMRT H&N phantom results

- 419 irradiations were analyzed
- 322 irradiations passed the criteria
  - 68 institutions irradiated multiple times
- 97 irradiations did not pass the criteria
- 322 institutions are represented

**Only 76% of institutions passed the criteria on the first irradiation.**




# Examples of Failures





# Comparison: Planned vs. Delivered Distribution



# Explanations for Failures

Explanation	Minimum # of occurrences
incorrect output factors in TPS	1
incorrect PDD in TPS	1
inadequacies in beam modeling at leaf ends (Cadman, et al; PMB 2002)	14
not adjusting MU to account for dose differences measured with ion chamber	3
errors in couch indexing with Peacock system	2
2 mm tolerance on MLC leaf position	1
setup errors	7
target malfunction	1

# Lung Phantom Irradiations

TPS	Dose Calc. Algor correction on	Number of irradiations	$D_{\text{hetero}}/D_{\text{homo}}$
Precise v 2.01	Scatter Integ. Clarkson Type	2	$1.19 \pm 2.6\%$
BrainLab	Clarkson & Pencil Beam	5	$1.22 \pm 2.2\%$
Eclipse	Pencil Beam	5	$1.18 \pm 4.3\%$
Ergo	3D Convolution Pencil Beam	5	$1.19 \pm 0.1\%$
Render plan	Change in primary attenuation	1	1.20
Pinnacle v 6.2, 6.4, 7.0g, 7.4f	Adaptative Convolve	10	$1.13 \pm 2.1\%$
XiO	Superposition/ Convolution	5	$1.11 \pm 2.3\%$
<b>Total</b>		<b>33</b>	




# TLD Dose vs. Hetero Corrected Plan

TPS	Dose Calc. Algor correction on	Number of irradiations	$D_{TLD}/D_{hetero}$
Precise v 2.01	Scatter Integ. Clarkson Type	2	$0.99 \pm 3.1\%$
BrainLab	Clarkson & Pencil Beam	5	$0.96 \pm 2.4\%$
Eclipse	Pencil Beam	5	$0.96 \pm 1.8\%$
Ergo	3D Convolution Pencil Beam	2	$0.98 \pm 3.2\%$
Render plan	Change in primary attenuation	1	0.92
Pinnacle v 6.2, 6.4, 7.0g, 7.4f	Adaptative Convolve	10	$0.99 \pm 2.1\%$
XiO	Superposition/ Convolution	5	$0.96 \pm 2.0\%$
<b>Total</b>		<b>33</b>	

# Convolution R-L Profile

14

Right Left Profile  
Axial plane








# Pencil-Beam Profile

41

Right Left Profile  
Axial plane



# Errors, Inconsistencies, and Misunderstandings Discovered Through Credentialing

- RTPS used incorrect grid size, displayed isodoses in error
- RTPS truncated dose value; isodose incorrect
- Errors applying NIST 1999 correction
- Misunderstandings about TG-43
- Misunderstanding of protocol, volumes
- Poor brachytherapy technique



# Quality Control

PS = Patient specific, W = Weekly, M =Monthly,  
 Q = Quarterly, A = Annually,  
 U = After software or hardware update

<b>Subject</b>	<b>Test</b>	<b>PS</b>	<b>W</b>	<b>M</b>	<b>Q</b>	<b>A</b>	<b>U</b>
<b>Hardware</b>							
CPU	<u>QC Test 1</u>			*			*
Digitizer	<u>QC Test 2</u>		* <sup>1</sup>	* <sup>2</sup>			*
Plotter	<u>QC Test 3</u>				*		*
Backup recovery	<u>QC Test 4</u>				*		*
<b>Anatomical information</b>							
CT (or other) scan transfer	<u>QC Test 5</u>	*					*
CT geometry and density check	<u>QC Test 6</u>				*		*
Patient anatomy	<u>QC Test 7</u>	*					*
<b>External beam software</b>							
<i>(photons and electrons)</i>							
Revalidation (including MU)	<u>QC Test 8</u>	*				*	*
Monitor unit	<u>QC Test 9</u>	*					
Plan details	<u>QC Test 10</u>	*		*			
Electronic plan transfer	<u>QC Test 11</u>	*		*		*	*
<b>Brachytherapy</b>							
Revalidation	<u>QC Test 12</u>					*	*
Plan details	<u>QC Test 13</u>	*					
Independent dose/time check	<u>QC Test 14</u>	*					
Electronic plan transfer	<u>QC Test 15</u>	*		*		*	*
<b>TPS software recommissioning</b>							
	<u>Section</u>						
	10.3.2.4						

<sup>1</sup> Sonic digitizer, <sup>2</sup> Electromagnetic digitizer

# QA Administration




- One “qualified medical physicist” responsible
- Documentation of QA process
- Record results
- Clear channels of communication re:
  - Software changes on RTPS
  - New/altered data files
  - CT imager software/hardware changes
  - Machine output changes

# Issues Not Addressed in Current Reports

- Issues related to IMRT, gated therapy, image guidance (tomotherapy, cone beam CT), daily dose reconstruction
- TG 100 – Methods for Evaluating QA Needs in Radiation Therapy
  - Problems with the “old approach” to QA
  - Recommended risk-assessment approach
    - Systemic approach to processes rather than “human failure”
    - Failure modes and effects analysis (FMEA)
    - Identification and prioritization of failure pathways
    - Determination of achievable QM program based on risk analysis
  - Examples of application to IMRT, HDR brachytherapy
  - Suggestions for applying FMEA in radiation therapy

# Summary

- Formal QC program includes:
  - User training
  - Well-defined acceptance tests
  - Well-defined (re)commissioning tests
  - Well-defined repeatability checks
  - Appropriate actions as needed
  - Documentation of results
  - Patient specific QC
- Process QA
  - Incident/error rate
  - Number of replans
  - Timeliness
  - Physician satisfaction




# RTPS QA - Key Issues

## Education



## Documentation



## Verification



## Communication

